A review of the Oxford Literary Festival 2013
Dr Brydon - the only survivor of the 18,000 strong British retreat from Kabul in 1842 |
There is an
unfortunate tendency in this country – including, perhaps especially, on the
‘left’ – to think of the ‘war on terror’ and its attendant horrors as a US
crime. Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, drone strikes…all have become bywords for US
atrocities; virtually household names. But how many are aware that the modern
system of secret prisons, the interrogation techniques used in the prison abuse
scandals, and the use of aerial bombing to suppress resistance, were all
pioneered by the British, and still used by British governments today? Likewise,
US-sponsored coups in Guatemala and Chile are notorious, as is the Vietnam war
– but British crimes, in Malaysia, Kenya, Korea and elsewhere remain largely
hidden from public discourse (despite valiant attempts by such historians as John
Newsinger and Mark Curtis).
So it is good to see a number of
authors at the festival tackling the specifically British role in the
perpetration of bloody injustice across the centuries.
The path that led journalist Ian
Cobain to write “Cruel Britannia: A Secret History of Torture” began with his
reporting on a number of ‘terrorism trials’ over the past
decade. He noticed that identical accounts about the presence of MI5 officials
in between bouts of torture in Pakistani jails began to emerge time and again
from the defendants in these trials. Each time, after a bout of torture, two
British men would enter the room and introduce themselves. They would question
the suspect for ten minutes or so, during which time no physical mistreatment
would take place. They would begin by asking the same set of questions as the
Pakistani interrogators had done during the torture, but would then move on to
a set of new questions, before leaving the room. The torment would then begin
again, with these new questions forming the basis of the next session of
interrogation and torture. After travelling to Pakistan to meet the lawyer of
one of the accused – who confirmed that torture is standard for terror suspects
in the country, as is the presence of MI5 officials in the case of British
citizens – he began to suspect there might be an official British torture
policy. Eventually, he discovered that there was – the “Agency policy on
liaison with foreign intelligence service in relation to suspects who may be
subject to mistreatment”, created by the Labour government in 2002 to allow British
agents to interrogate prisoners undergoing torture. The discovery of this
document then led him to look further back, discovering that Britain had run a
string of secret prisons during World War Two in locations such as Berlin,
Hanover, Cairo and Casablanca, as well as an interrogation centre in Kensington
Gardens where not only defendants, but also witnesses, at war crimes trials
were regularly tortured. Intriguingly, the wartime organization set up to run
these secret prisons – the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre –
preceded the establishment of a US organization of the same name, and trained
its staff. Not surprisingly, the techniques of torture were then honed during
the brutal suppression of rebellions in the colonies. What became known as the
‘five techniques’ – hooding, sleep deprivation, starvation, stress and noise –
the very techniques so familiar to us from recent images from Iraq – were
crafted during Britain’s colonial wars in Kenya and Malaya in the 1950s – with
the fifth technique being added in 1970 in Ireland. The legal case around the
death of Baha Mousa in British custody in Iraq revealed that these techniques
are still being used today.
Victoria
Brittain’s latest book “Shadow Lives” also deals with the British role in the war
on terror, not so much its impact on British citizens abroad, as on foreign
citizens in Britain - specifically, the families of people placed under ‘house
arrest’. Initially, in the weeks following September 11th, the
British government decreed that foreign citizens could be detained without
charge indefinitely. This policy was ended by the House of Lords, and the
government’s response was the introduction of “control orders”, a form of house
arrest whereby the victim of such an order must stay in their house – indeed,
often in only one specific portion of their house – for almost the whole day,
with just a short window for leaving the house to travel only in the immediate
surrounding area. Any visitors to their house must have gained prior approval
from both the Foreign Office and the security services. As Brittain pointed
out, when one member of a family is under ‘house arrest’, in effect “the whole
family is put under house arrest”. Since these laws, however, only apply to
foreign nationals, the British government ingeniously passed a law in 2003 to
allow the government to strip British citizens of their citizenship. Theresa
May has been particularly keen on using this law, and as the Independent
exposed recently, has used it 16 times since coming to office. Two of those
stripped of citizenship went on to be killed in drone strikes abroad, but as
they were no longer ‘British citizens’, the government was able to wash their
hands of any responsibility. Brittain discussed in particular the example of
Mehdi Hashi, a young Somali-British man who grew up in Kentish Town, who was
stripped of his British citizenship last June and has now very likely been
subjected to ‘extraordinary rendition’ in Somalia.
The novelist
William Sutcliffe, sharing the panel with Victoria Brittain, noted that this
model of turning people into ‘non-citizens’ in order to strip them of their
rights, is precisely the Israeli method of dealing with Palestinians.
Palestinians are not citizens of any state, and therefore have access to neither
the minimum wage, nor to civilian courts, subject only to Israeli military law,
where they are not allowed to see the evidence against them, and the conviction
rates are more than 99%. Sutcliffe’s novel ‘The Wall’ is set in a “mythical
version” of the West Bank, where Joshua, a Jewish boy living next to the
apartheid wall, who has grown up being told the other side is full of
unimaginable horrors, one day finds a tunnel underneath, and ventures down it.
Thus, Sutcliffe explains, the novel is an inversion of the classic ‘fantasy
portal’ plot – rather than the portal (tornado, wardrobe) providing a way out
of mundane reality and into a world of fantasy, the tunnel provides an escape
from his fantasy life and into a world of brutal reality. Sutcliffe said he was
drawn to the Wall as a setting for his story as it epitomized the “division
between haves and have-nots [which] seems to be the story of our times”.
The other
story of our times – and one similarly symbolized by the apartheid Wall – is
the story of occupation, imperial hubris and the illusion of military security.
As Michael Burleigh explains, in a discussion of his latest book “Small wars,
far away places”, the “conceit” of the British is that “we think we know how to
fight counter-insurgency wars”. The British love to contrast their supposed
‘success’ in Kenya and Malaya with French and US failures in Algeria and
Vietnam, but, Burleigh reminds us, this was not so much down to technique as
luck. Whereas the French were up against genuinely national mass movements in
Vietnam and Algeria, the British were fighting movements rooted in a particular
ethnic minority (the Kikuyu and the Chinese Malays) – and even then, it still
took them twelve years to achieve victory in Malaya. The British delusion remains,
however, that victory was actually due to success in ‘winning hearts and
minds’, combined with superior intelligence and special services. The other
delusion, of course, surrounds the reasons for the war. Burleigh notes that the
Malayan war (1948-60) was a war to maintain the exploitation of Malayan tin and
rubber, pure and simple. The dollar-earning capacity of these industries was
necessary “to build the New Jerusalem, whilst retaining a ‘place at the top
table’ in foreign affairs – and Attlee and Bevin shared that goal as much as
any Tory imperialist”. Likewise, Burleigh notes, “one is struck by the air of
self-congratulation that surrounds decolonization”. The reality is that
decolonisation was forced on Britain, who then proceeded to make a mess of it,
“screwing up” the partitions of India and Palestine, leaving “legacies that
haunt us to this day”. These things matter, says Burleigh, because our failure
to understand the reality of the disasters created by our past colonial wars,
means we remain deluded that we have the ability to impose military solutions
on “faraway places” today.
William
Dalrymple’s latest offering “The Return of the King” – a new history of
Britain’s doomed occupation of Afghanistan between 1839 and 1842 – suffers from
no such delusions. Based on meticulous research - referencing no fewer than
nine previously untranslated contemporary Afghan accounts of the war –
Dalrymple offers a blow-by-blow account of the biggest British military
disaster of the nineteenth century. He explains how, just as in 2002, the
relative ease with which the ‘fall of Kabul’ was accomplished lulled the
imperial troops into a fatal complacency. A fort was established in a completely
indefensible valley, such was the “smugness” of the British occupiers. Things
started to go wrong, however, when austerity started to bite. As Dalrymple
explains, it is not the conquest of Afghanistan that is difficult – “The
Greeks, the Turks, the Mughals, Nadir Shah, all conquered Afghanistan”, he
reminds us. “What is impossible is paying
for the occupation of Afghanistan.” Unlike Iraq, there are no oil wells to
loot; and unlike India, there are not enough productive farmers to tax: the
army of occupation cannot be paid for by the exploitation of native people and
their resources. It drains money. The East India Company, in charge of the
operation, was making a fortune selling India-grown opium to China, but its
entire profit ended up being poured into the Afghan adventure. So, then as now,
the British began training an Afghan army “to keep the puppet in place” – and then
expropriated the local nobles to pay for it. In addition, they cut the
subsidies being paid to local tribes in order to keep the passes open. The last
straw was when the occupying army began “turning Kabul into a brothel”. If they
are not stopped, wrote one Afghan chronicler, “the English will ride the donkey
of desires into the field of stupidity”. Armed insurrection followed - and the
rest is history. Within 24 hours, the British army’s supplies and ammunition
stores had been captured. Under bombardment from the surrounding hills, the
garrison ate “first the beagles, then the horses, and then the rats” - and then
surrendered. Of the column of 18,000 who embarked on the long retreat out of
the country, only 1 reached their final destination (Dr Brydon), the rest
having either been shot, frozen, starved or kidnapped en route. Al Qaeda’s
chilling warning to the latest generation of occupiers – that “this time, there
will be no Dr Brydons” was universally understood by all the Afghans who heard
it. Zawahari, the Al Qaeda leader who made the comment, well understands the
link between occupation and the draining of resources, and drawing the West
into expensive and unwinnable wars is the key tenet of his strategy for
bringing down the infidels and their Empire. He is certainly familiar with the
lessons of the 1842, as expressed so succinctly by Mirza Attah: “The English
love gold and money, but what did Afghanistan bring them other than the
exhausting of their Treasury and the disgracing of their army?”
Dalrymple
finishes his talk on a salutary note: he reports that China has just bought up
the mining rights to Afghanistan, and thus “by doing business without sending
in a single soldier, I think the Chinese will succeed where Britain has failed
four times over”. The question is - will the British learn the lesson?
An edited version of this article first appeared in the Morning Star
An edited version of this article first appeared in the Morning Star